Xoring two permutations is a very simple way to construct pseudorandom functions from pseudorandom permutations. The aim of this paper is to get precise security results for this construction. Since such construction has many applications in cryptography (see [2, 3, 4, 6] for example), this problem is interesting both from a theoretical and from a practical point of view. In [6] , it was proved that Xoring two random permutations gives a secure pseudorandom function if m 2 2n 3 . By "secure" we mean here that the scheme will resist all adaptive chosen plaintext attacks limited to m queries (even with unlimited computing power). More generally in [6] it is also proved that with k Xor, instead of 2, we have security when m 2 kn k+1 . In this paper we will prove that for k = 2, we have in fact already security when m O(2 n ). Therefore we will obtain a proof of a similar result claimed in [2] (security when m O(2 n /n 2/3 )). Moreover our proof is very different from the proof strategy suggested in [2] (we do not use Azuma inequality and Chernoff bounds for example), and we will get precise and explicit O functions. Another interesting point of our proof is that we will show that this (cryptographic) problem of security is directly related to a very simple to describe and purely combinatorial problem.
Introduction
The problem of converting pseudorandom permutations (PRP) into pseudorandom functions (PRF) named "Luby-Rackoff backwards" was first considered in [3] . This problem is obvious if we are interested in an asymptotical polynomial versus non polynomial security model (since a PRP is then a PRF), but not if we are interested in achieving more optimal and concrete security bounds. More precisely, the loss of security when regarding a PRP as a PRF comes from the "birthday attack" which can distinguish a random permutation from a random function of n bits to n bits, in 2 n 2 operations and 2 n 2 queries. Therefore different ways to build PRF from PRP with a security above 2 n 2 and by performing very few computations have been suggested (see [2, 3, 4, 6] ). One of the simplest way (and the way that gives so far our best security result) is simply to Xor k independent pseudorandom permutations, for example with k = 2. In [6] (Theorem 2 p.474), it has been proved, with a simple proof, that the Xor of k independent PRP gives a PRF with security at least in O(2 k k+1 n ). (For k = 2 this gives O(2 2 3 n )). In [2] , a much more complex strategy (based on Azuma inequality and Chernoff bounds) is presented. It is claimed that with this strategy we may prove that the Xor of two PRP gives a PRF with security at least in O(2 n /n 2 3 ) and at most in O(2 n ), which is much better than the birthday bound in O(2 n 2 ). However the authors of [2] present a very general framework of proof and they do not give every details for this result. For example, page 9 they wrote "we give only a very brief summary of how this works", and page 10 they introduce O functions that are not easy to express explicitly. In this paper we will use a completely different proof strategy, based on the "coefficient H technique" (see Section 3 below), simple counting arguments and induction. We will need a few pages, but we will get like this a self contained proof of security in O(2 n ) for the Xor of two permutations with a very precise O function. Since building PRF from PRP has many applications (see [2, 3, 4] ), we think that these results are really interesting both from theoretical and from practical point of view. It may be also interesting to notice that there are many similarities between this problem and the security of Feistel schemes built with random round functions (also called Luby-Rackoff constructions). In [7] , it was proved that for L-R constructions with k rounds functions we have security that tends to O(2 n ) when the number k of rounds tends to infinity. Then in [11] , it was proved that security in O(2 n ) was obtained not only for k → +∞, but already for k = 7. Similarly, we have seen that in [6] it was proved that for the Xor of k PRP we have security that tends O(2 n ) when k → +∞. In this paper, we show that security in O(2 n ) is not only for k → +∞, but already for k = 2.
Notation and Aim of this paper
In all this paper we will denote I n = {0, 1} n . F n will be the set of all applications from I n to I n , and B n will be the set of all permutations from I n to I n . Therefore |I n | = 2 n , |F n | = 2 n·2 n and |B n | = (2 n )!. x ∈ R A means that x is randomly chosen in A with a uniform distribution.
The aim of this paper is to prove the theorem below, with an explicit O function (to be determined).
Theorem 1 For all CPA-2 (Adaptive chosen plaintext attack) φ on a function G of F n with m chosen plaintext, we have: Adv 1. For all sequences a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, of pairwise distinct elements of I n and for all sequences b i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, of E we have:
H ≥ |B n | 2 2 nm (1 − α) where H denotes the number of (f, g) ∈ B 2 n such that ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (f ⊕ g)(a i ) = b i . Then 2. For every CPA-2 with m chosen plaintexts we have: p ≤ α + β where p = Adv PRF φ denotes the probability to distinguish f ⊕ g when (f, g) ∈ R B 2 n from a function h ∈ R F n .
Proof of Theorem 2
It is not very difficult to prove Theorem 2 with classical counting arguments. This proof technique is sometimes called the "Coefficient H technique". A complete proof of Theorem 2 can also be found in [10] page 27 and a similar Theorem was used in [11] p.517. In order to have all the proofs in this paper, Theorem 2 is also proved in Appendix F.
How to get Theorem 1 from Theorem 2 In order to get Theorem 1 from Theorem 2, a sufficient condition is to prove that for " most" (most since we need β small) sequences of values 
Therefore from Theorem 2 we will have for all α > 0:
, and E(H) = |Bn| 2 2 nm , Theorem 1 comes from Theorem 2. Introducing N instead of H H is (by definition) the number of (f, g) ∈ B 2 n such that ∀i,
Let N be the number of sequences x i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, x i ∈ I n , such that:
. (Since when x i is fixed, f and g are fixed on exactly m pairwise distinct points by ∀i,
Thus we have
Therefore, instead of evaluating E(H) and σ(H), we can evaluate E(N ) and σ(N ), and our aim is to prove that
As we will see, the most difficult part will be the evaluation of σ(N ). (We will see in Section 5 that this evaluation of σ(N ) leads us to a purely combinatorial problem: the evaluation of values that we will call λ α ).
Remark: We will not do it, nor need it, in this paper, but it is possible to improve slightly the bounds by using a more precise evaluation than the Bienayme-Tchebichev Theorem: instead of
it is possible to prove that for our variables N , and for t >> 1, we have something like this:
(For this we would have to analyze more precisely the law of distribution of N : it follows almost a Gaussian and this gives a better evaluation than just the general 1 t 2 ).
Computation of E(N )
Let b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ), and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). For x ∈ I m n , let
n be the set of all sequences x i such that all the
as expected.
First results on V (N )
We denote by V (N ) the variance of N when b ∈ R I m n . We have seen that our aim (cf(3.1)) is to prove that V (N )
). With the same notations as in Section 4 above, N = x∈J m n δ x . Since the variance of a sum is the sum of the variances plus the sum of all covariances we have:
We will now study the 3 terms in (5.1), i.e. the terms in V (δ x ), the terms in E(δ x δ x ) and the terms in
This term is less than E(N ) and therefore is much less than
Terms in E(δ x δ x ) Therefore the last term A m that we have to evaluate in (5.1) is 
We want to prove that V (N ) E 2 (N ). Therefore, our aim is to prove that
Change of variables
We will call these conditions 1.2.3.4. the "conditions λ α ". (Examples of λ m values are given in Appendix A). In order to get (5.6), we see that a sufficient condition is finally to prove that
with an explicit O function. So we have transformed our security proof against all CPA-2 for f ⊕ g, f, g ∈ R B n , to this purely combinatorial problem (5. is not obvious: we will need a few pages. However, fortunately, the mathematics that we will use are simple).
First results in λ α
The values λ α have been introduced in Section 5. Our aim is to prove (5.7), (or something similar, for example with O( m k+1 2 nk ) for any integer k) with explicit O functions. For this, we will proceed like this: in this Section 6 we will give a first evaluation of the values λ α . Then, in Section 7, we will prove an induction formula (7.2) on λ α . Finally, in the Appendices, we will use this induction formula (7.2) to get our property on λ α .
Similarly, we want to obtain an induction formula on λ α , i.e. we want to evaluate
λα . More precisely our aim is to prove something like this:
Notice that here we have O( α 2 2n ) and not O( α 2 n ). Therefore we want something like this:
(with some specific O functions) Then, from (6.2) used for all 1 ≤ i ≤ α and since λ 1 = U 1 = 2 3n , we will get
and therefore we will get property (5.4):
as wanted. Notice that to get here 0(
We will denote by β 1 , . . . , β 4α the 4α equalities that should not be satisfied here:
such that they satisfy conditions λ α , for f α+1 that satisfy 2), we have 2 n − α solutions and for g α+1 that satisfy 3) we have 2 n − α solutions. Now when f i , g i , h i , 1 ≤ i ≤ α, and f α+1 , g α+1 are fixed such that they satisfy 1), 2), 3), for h α+1 that satisfy 4) and 5) we have between 2 n − α and 2 n − 2α possibilities. Therefore (first evaluation for
This an approximation in O( α 2 n ) and from it we get
i.e. we get security until α 2 2 n , i.e. until α √ 2 n . However, we want security until α 2 n and not only α √ 2 n , so we want a better evaluation for λ α+1 2 3n ·λα (i.e. we want something like (6.3) instead of (6.4)).
7 An induction formula on λ α A more precise evaluation
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4α, we will denote by B i the set of (f 1 , . . . , f α+1 , g 1 , . . . , g α+1 , h 1 , . . . , h α+1 ), that satisfy the conditions λ α and the conditions β i . Therefore we have:
We know that for any set A i and any integer µ, we have:
Moreover, each set of 5 (or more) equations β i is in contradiction with the conditions λ α because we will have at least two equations in f , or two in g, or two in h, or two in f ⊕ g ⊕ h (and f α+1 = f i and f α+1 = f j gives f i = f j with i = j and 1 ≤ α, j ≤ α, in contradiction with λ α ). Therefore, we have:
In B i , we have the conditions λ α plus the equation β i , and β i will fix f α+1 , or g α+1 , or h α+1 from the other values. Therefore:
First Case: β i and β j are two equations in f (or two in g, or two in h, or two in f ⊕ g ⊕ h. ( For example: f α+1 = f 1 and f α+2 = f 2 ). Then these equations are not compatible with the conditions
Second Case: we are not in the first case. Then two variables (for example f α and g α ) are fixed from the others. Therefore:
• 3 equations.
If we have two equations in f , or in g, or in h, or in f ⊕ g ⊕ h, we have |B i ∩ B j ∩ B k | = 0. If we are not in these cases, then f α+1 , g α+1 and h α+1 are fixed by the three equations from the other variables, and then
• 4 equations.
This value is different from 0 only if we have one equation
. . , α}, that satisfy the conditions λ α plus the equation X:
Case 1. i, j, k, l are pairwise distinct. Here we have α(α−1)(α−2)(α−3) = α 4 −6α 3 +11α 2 −6α possibilities for i, j, k, l and from the symmetries of all indexes in the conditions λ α , all the λ α (X) of this case 1 are equal. We denote by λ (4) α this value of λ α (X). (The (4) here is to remember that we have exactly 4 indexes i, j, k, l).
Case 2. In {i, j, k, l}, we have exactly 3 indexes. Here we have 6α(α − 1)(α − 2) = 6α 3 − 18α 2 + 12α possibilities for i, j, k, l (since there are 6 possibilities to choose an equality). From the symmetries in the conditions λ α , all the λ α (X) of this case 2 are equal. We denote by λ
Case 3. In {i, j, k, l}, 3 indexes have the same value (example i = j = k) and the other one has a different value. Then X is not compatible with the conditions λ α .
Case 4. In i, j, k, l, we have 2 indexes and we are not in the Case 3 (for example i = j and k = l). Here we have 3α(α − 1) = 3α 2 − 3α possibilities for i, j, k, l. From the symmetries in the conditions λ α all the λ α (X) of this case 4 are equal. We denote by λ (2) α this value of λ α (X). Case 5. We have i = j = k = l. Here we have α possibilities for i, j, k, l. Here X is always true, and λ α (X) = λ α .
From these 5 cases we get:
We will denote by [λ α ] any value of λ α (X) such that X is compatible with the conditions λ α and such that X is not always true (X is not 0 = 0). Then, from (7.1) we write
where A · [λ α ] is just a notation to mean that we have A terms λ α but each of these λ α may have different values. Our aim is to get (6.3) from (7.2). For this we see that we have to prove that
for "most" values [λ α ] or for the values λ
α . This is what we will do in the Appendices. 
2 n · 2 3n (8.1) Therefore, by using U α of section 6 we have:
Therefore, with (8.1) we have
with
and (8.5 ) and (5.5) we get:
Therefore, from (3.1) we get that the best CPA-2 attacks φ satisfy:
More precisely, by using (8.3) and (8.4) we get:
Here we have 
). Finally, in Appendix E, we will iterate the process in order to obtain security in m O(2 n ) as wanted.
9 A simple variant of the schemes with only one permutation
, with f ∈ R B n and x ∈ I n−1 . This variant was already introduced in [2] and it is for this that in [2] p.9 the security in
In fact, from a theoretical point of view, this variant G is very similar to G, and it is possible to prove that our analysis can be modified to obtain a similar proof of security for G .
10 A simple property about the Xor of two permutations and a new conjecture I have conjectured this property:
Just one day after this paper was put on eprint, J.F. Dillon pointed to us that in fact this was proved in 1952 in [5] . We thank him a lot for this information. (This property was proved again independently in 1979 in [12]).
A new conjecture. However I conjecture a stronger property. Conjecture:
Variant: I also conjecture that this property is true in any group, not only with Xor. Remark: in this paper, I have proved weaker results involving m equations with m O(2 n ) instead of all the 2 n equations. These weaker results were sufficient for the cryptographic security wanted.
Conclusion
The results in this paper improve our understanding of the PRF-security of the Xor of two random permutations. More precisely in this paper we have proved that the Adaptive Chosen Plaintext security for this problem is in O(2 n ), and we have obtained an explicit O function. These results belong to the field of finding security proofs for cryptographic designs above the "birthday bound". (In [1, 7, 11] , some results "above the birthday bound" on completely different cryptographic designs are also given). Our proofs need a few pages, so are a bit hard to read, but the results obtained are very easy to use and the mathematics used are elementary (essentially combinatorial and induction arguments). Moreover, we have proved (in Section 5) that this cryptographic problem of security is directly related to a very simple to describe and purely combinatorial problem. We have obtained this transformation by combining the "coefficient H technique" of [10, 11] and a specific computation of the standard deviation of H. (In a way, from a cryptographic point of view, this is maybe the most important result, and all the analysis after Section 5 can be seen as combinatorial mathematics and not cryptography anymore). Since building PRF from PRP has many practical applications,we believe that these results are of real interest both from a theoretical point of view and a practical point of view.
[9] Jacques Patarin. Generic Attacks for the Xor of k Random Permutations. As examples, we present here the exact values for λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 .
Computation of λ 1
From the general formula (7.1) or (7.2) of Section 7, we have (with α = 1):
(here [λ 1 ] = 0 since we have only one indice and in X we must have at least two indices).
Computations of λ 2 from the β i equations
Therefore λ 2 = (2 3n − 4 · 2 2n + 6 · 2 n − 3)λ 1 (as expected we obtain the same result as above). Computation of λ 3 from (7.2) From the general formulas (7.1) and (7.2), we have (with α = 2):
is the number of (
give the same value λ (2) 2 ). When f 1 , g 1 , h 1 are fixed (we have 2 3n possibilities) then we will choose f 2 = f 1 , h 2 = h 1 , and g 2 = f 1 ⊕ f 2 ⊕ g 1 (so we have g 2 = g 1 and f 2 ⊕ g 2 ⊕ h 2 = f 1 ⊕ g 1 ⊕ h 1 ). Therefore λ (2) 2 = 2 3n · (2 n − 1) 2 and the exact value of λ 3 is:
from the β i equations
Here X is:
• X+2 equations. If the 2 equations β i are (f 1 = f 2 and g 1 = g 2 ), or (h 1 = h 2 and f 1 ⊕g 1 ⊕h 1 = f 2 ⊕ g 2 ⊕ h 2 ), then X is the Xor of these equations. Therefore
• X + 3 equations. X is always a consequence of the 3 equations, i<j<k |B i ∩ B j ∩ B k | = 4λ 1 .
•
(as expected we obtain the same result as above). Remark. Here
Therefore we see that in 2 n [λ α ] λ α , we have sometimes a term in O( 1 2 n ). However this is exceptional: here f 1 ⊕ g 1 = f 2 ⊕ g 2 is the Xor of the conditions f 1 = f 2 and g 1 = g 2 , or of the conditions h 1 = h 2 and f 2 ⊕ g 2 ⊕ h 2 = f 1 ⊕ g 1 ⊕ h 1 . Moreover here we have only 2 indices.
B Evaluations of
By definition [λ α ] denotes (as we have seen in Section 7) the number of (f 1 , . . . , f α , g 1 , . . . , g α , h 1 , . . . , h α ) of I 3α n that satisfy the conditions λ α plus an equation X of the type:
with i, j, k, l ∈ {1, . . . , α} such that X is compatible with the conditions λ α and such that X is not 0 = 0 (i.e. we do not have i = j = k = l). We have seen in Section 7 that [λ α ] is not a fixed value: it can be λ (4) α (by symmetries of the hypothesis for this case we can assume X to be:
(for this case we can assume X to be:
(for this case we can assume X to be: f α ⊕ g α = f α−1 ⊕ g α−1 ). However, as we will see all these three values [λ α ] are very near, and they are very near 
Proof of Theorem 3
We will present here the proof with X :
The proof is exactly similar for all the other cases. From (6.4), we have:
We will now evaluate [λ α ] from λ α−2 .
In [λ α ] we have the condition λ α−2 plus
We can decide that X will fix h α from the other values:
, and we can decide that conditions 2., 3., 4. and 8. will be written in h α−1 and g α−1 :
In this set we have between α − 2 and 3(α − 2) elements when h 1 , . . . , h α−2 are pairwise distinct.
In this set we have between α − 2 and α − 1 elements when g 1 , . . . , g α−2 are pairwise distinct
comes from the last condition 8).
Similarly, we can write conditions 6 and 7 in g α :
In this set we have between α − 1 and 2(α − 1) elements when g 1 , . . . , g α−1 are pairwise distinct. Therefore we get:
So we have:
and with (B1) this gives: 
Theorem 4 We have Adv
C An induction formula on λ 2. This condition X is satisfied:
(there we have chosen the indices α + 1, 1, 2, 3 but all other choices of 4 distinct indices give the same result λ (4) α+1 due to the symmetries of the conditions λ α+1 ).
In this Appendix, we will compute λ (4) α+1 from λ α and other values with indices less than or equal to α.
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4α, we will denote by B i the set of (f 1 , . . . , f α+1 , g 1 , . . . , g α+1 , h 1 , . . . , h α+1 ) that satisfy the conditions λ α and that satisfy the conditions β i , and the condition X (the β i equations have been defined in Section 6). Therefore we have:
We will proceed here exactly as in section 6, but with the sets B i instead of the sets B i . Since 5 equations β i are always incompatible with the conditions λ α , we have:
Then X and β i will fix two variables among f α+1 , g α+1 , h α+1 from the other variables f i , g i , h i . Therefore:
, where [λ α ] denotes the number of (f i , g i , h i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ α, that satisfy the conditions λ α plus the equation
α , and if l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we will denote [λ α ] = λ (3) α . From Cases 1 and 2, we get:
Let β i and β j be these two equations. Case 1: β i and β j are two equations in f , or in g, or in h, or in f ⊕ g ⊕ h. Then |B i ∩ B j | = 0. Case 2: β i and β j are not in f ⊕ g ⊕ h and we are not in Case 1. Then |B i ∩ B j | = λ α . (Here we have 3α 2 possibilities for the indices).
Case 3: β i is in f ⊕ g ⊕ h, but not β j (or the opposite). (Here we have 3α 2 possibilities for the indices). For example
Then, with the same notation as above for X + 1 equations,
. Then from Cases 1, 2, 3, we get:
• X + 3 equations. Let β i , β j and β k be these three equations. Case 1: If we have with β i , β j , β k , two conditions in f , or two conditions in g, or two conditions in h, or two conditions in
Case 2: X is a linear dependency of β i , β j , β k . Then β i , β j , β k are: f α+1 = f 1 , g α+1 = g 2 , h α+1 = h 3 and we have here:
Case 3: X is not a linear dependency of β i , β j , β k and in β i , β j , β k , we have one equation in f , one equation in g and one equation in h (none in f ⊕ g ⊕ h). 
where most of the [λ α ] are λ
Then, with X, we obtain:
Case 1: Y and Z give only one equation.
Then (i = 1, j = 2, k = 3), or (i = l, j = l, k = l) and we have α possibilities for l. Then
Case 2: X, λ α and the 4 equations β i are not compatible. These cases are (i = l, j = l, k = l), or (j = l, k = l, i = l), or (i = l, k = l, j = l), or (j = 2, k = 3, i = 1), or (i = 1, k = 3, j = 2) or (i = 1, j = 2, k = 3) or (i = j = k = l). So we have here 7α(α − 1) possibilities for the indices.
Case 3: We are not in Case 1 or in Case 2. Then
, where [λ α ] denotes the number of (f i , g i , h i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ α, that satisfy the conditions λ α plus the equations Y and Z:
Then from Cases 1, 2, 3, we get:
Therefore the induction formula for λ (4) α+1 gives:
In this formula:
α , i.e. is for i, j, k, l, 1, 2, 3 pairwise distinct with equations:
• The terms in
α . So λ 
. Now by induction from these terms, more general terms will appears. This is why we will establish properties on more general equations than λ α and λ We will denote by
. We want now a better evaluation of |[ α ]|, since this will give us (cf formula (8.6)) a better security result. If we write formula (C.1) of Appendix C in [ α ] instead of [λ α ], we get:
Similarly, if we write formula (7.2) of Section 7 in [ α ] instead of [λ α ], we get:
, we obtain:
Therefore:
Where "negl" are some terms negligible compared with [ α ] α 2 n , or negligible compared with O( 1 2 n ). Now, exactly as we have proved (cf Appendix B): 
Now from (6.4) we have: (6.4) and (D.5) we get:
Now from our first approximation
(where o( 
One more time
) Therefore, if α ≥ 5, we can write:
Now from (D.8) and (8.6) we get:
Therefore here we have obtained security when m 2 . Moreover, what we did in Appendix D is just the same thing as in Appendix B, with the analysis of λ α values (with 2 more equations X and Y than λ α ) in a similar way of λ α values (with one more equation X than λ α ). Obviously, we can iterate the process by introducing λ α (with 3 more equations) in the same way etc. With λ α we will obtain a better evaluation for
λα and from it and formula (D.4), it will give us a better bound for |[ α ]|. If we look at the process of the proof that we use here (in order to obtain proofs of security in 2 kn k+1 for larger and larger k) we see that we use two types of relations:
λα etc. This is easily obtained as in Appendix B. More precisely, by iterating the evaluation of Appendix B, we get: α than in λ α ).
We have an induction formula that gives λ [µ]
α+1 from values λ
By combining 1 and 2, we get security better and better when µ increases. More precisely, if we look at the number of operations that we perform in order to obtain security in m 2 kn k+1 , we see that the coefficient involved increases at most in 2 k . Therefore from (8.6) we will get:
(In formula (D.9) the term
This gives security when m 2 kn k+1 for any integer k. Finally, by choosing k = n, we can notice that
n (since m ≤ 2 n ). Therefore we have:
This gives security when m 2 n , as wanted.
F Proof of a "coefficients H" Theorem
We present here a proof in English of a Theorem published in French in 1991 in J.Patarin PhD Thesis p.27(see [10] ). This result was used in various papers (in Europe and Japan for example) but no english version of the proof was published so far. The corollary in the case of the Xor of two random permutations is also presented here.
Theorem 5 Let k be an integer. Let K be a set of k-uples of functions (f 1 , . . . , f k ). Let G be an application of K → F n (Therefore G is a way to design a function of F n from k-uples (f 1 , . . . , f k ) of K). Let α and β be real numbers, α > 0 and β > 0. Let E be a subset of I m n such that
If: 1) For all sequences a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, of pairwise distinct elements of I n and for all sequences b i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, of E we have:
Then 2) For every CPA-2 with m chosen plaintexts we have: p ≤ α + β where p = Adv P RF φ denotes the probability to distinguish G(f 1 , . . . , f k ) when (f 1 , . . . , f k ) ∈ R K from a function f ∈ R F n (2).
Proof of Theorem 5
(We follow here a proof, in French, of this Theorem in J.Patarin, PhD Thesis, 1991, Page 27). Let φ be a (deterministic) algorithm which is used to test a function f of F n . (φ can test any function f from I n → I n ). φ can use f at most m times, that is to say that φ can ask for the values of some f (C i ), C i ∈ I n , 1 ≤ i ≤ m. (The value C 1 is chosen by φ, then φ receive f (C 1 ), then φ can choose any C 2 = C 1 , then φ receive f (C 2 ) etc). (Here we have adaptive chosen plaintexts). (If i = j, C i is always different from C j ). After a finite but unbounded amount of time, φ gives an output of "1" or "0". This output (1 or 0) is noted φ(f ).
We will denote by P * 1 , the probability that φ gives the output 1 when f is chosen randomly in F n . Therefore P * 1 = Number of functions f such that φ(f ) = 1 |F n | where |F n | = 2 n·2 n . We will denote by P 1 , the probability that φ gives the output 1 when (f 1 , . . . , f k ) ∈ R K and f = G(f 1 , . . . , f k ). Therefore P 1 = Number of (f 1 , . . . , f k ) ∈ K such that φ (G(f 1 , . . . , f k )) = 1 |K| We will prove: ("Main Lemma"): For all such algorithms φ, |P 1 − P * 1 | ≤ α + β Then Theorem 1 will be an immediate corollary of this "Main Lemma" since Adv P RF φ is the best |P 1 − P * 1 | that we can get with such φ algorithms. Proof of the "Main Lemma" Evaluation of P *
1
Let f be a fixed function, and let C 1 , . . . , C m be the successive values that the program φ will ask for the values of f (when φ tests the function f ). We will note σ 1 = f (C 1 ), . . . , σ m = f (C m ). φ(f ) depends only of the outputs σ 1 , . . . , σ m . That is to say that if f is another function of F n such that ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, f (C i ) = σ i , then φ(f ) = φ(f ). (Since for i < m, the choice of C i+1 depends only of σ 1 , . . . , σ i . Also the algorithm φ cannot distinguish f from f , because φ will ask for f and f exactly the same inputs, and will obtain exactly the same outputs). Conversely, let σ 1 , . . . , σ n be m elements of I n . Let C 1 be the first value that φ choose to know f (C 1 ), C 2 the value that φ choose when φ has obtained the answer σ 1 for f (C 1 ), . . ., and C m the m th value that φ presents to f , when φ has obtained σ 1 , . . . , σ m−1 for f (C 1 ), . . . , f (C m−1 ). Let φ(σ 1 , . . . , σ m ) be the output of φ (0 or 1). Then Number of (f 1 , . . . , f k ) ∈ K such that ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, G(f 1 , . . . , f k )(C i ) = σ i |K|
Now (by definition of β) we have at most β ·2 nm sequences (σ 1 , . . . , σ m ) such that (σ 1 , . . . , σ m ) / ∈ E. Therefore, we have at least N − β · 2 nm sequences (σ 1 , . . . , σ m ) such that φ(σ 1 , . . . σ m ) = 1 and (σ 1 , . . . , σ m ) ∈ E (4). Therefore, from (1), (3) and (4), we have
(1 − α) P 1 ≥ (P * 1 − β)(1 − α) Thus P 1 ≥ P * 1 − α − β (5), as claimed. We now have to prove the inequality in the other side. For this, let P * 0 be the probability that φ(f ) = 0 when f ∈ R F n . P 0 = 1 − P * 1 . Similarly, let P 0 be the probability that φ(f ) = 0 when (f 1 , . . . , f k ) ∈ R K and f = G(f 1 , . . . , f k ). P 0 = 1 − P 1 . We will have P 0 ≥ P * 0 − α − β (since the outputs 0 and 1 have symmetrical hypothesis. Or, alternatively since we can always consider an algorithm φ such that φ (f ) = 0 ⇔ φ(f ) = 1 and apply (5) to this algorithm φ ).
Therefore, 1 − P 1 ≥ 1 − P * 1 − α − β, i.e. P * 1 ≥ P 1 − α − β (6). Finally, from (5) and (6), we have: |P 1 − P * 1 | ≤ α + β, as claimed.
Example of Application: Xor of two permutations With k = 2, K = |B n | 2 and G(f 1 , . . . , f k ) = f 1 ⊕ f 2 we obtain immediately:
Theorem 6 Let α and β be real numbers, α > 0 and β > 0. Let E be a subset of I m n such that |E| ≥ (1 − β) · 2 nm .
where H denotes the number of (f, g) ∈ B 2 n such that ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, f ⊕ g(a i ) = b i Then 2) For every CPA-2 with m chosen plaintexts we have: p ≤ α + β where p = Adv P RF φ denotes the probability to distinguish f ⊕ g when (f, g) ∈ R B 2 n from a function h ∈ R F n .
